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Kurt Baier (1991) sets out the following definitions for the egoisms I'd like to talk about next.
Rational Egoism: "It is always rational (wise, reasonable, reason-backed)...to aim at one's own greatest good."
Ethical Egoism: "[It is always] right (moral, praiseworthy, virtuous) to aim at one's own greatest good."
Both of these are the weaker versions of the positions they name. The stronger versions circumscribe the weaker and additionally hold that it is never rational or moral not to aim at one's own greatest good.
Rational egoism, Baier thinks, is "highly plausible". Drawing on Butler's sermons, he quotes that "when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it." Now we are dangerously close to a return to psychological egoism. If Butler means by this that rational calculation about one's happiness is what goes on during moral reflection, we should pay it no mind for the same reasons we ignore PE. RE can either say something about the process of deliberation, or something about the goal of deliberation, understood to be rational from the outset. Should it be the first, it's either trivially true or momentously false. Should it be the second, I am not convinced that the maximization of one's own good is the kind of thing that can be rational, to say nothing of whether it's more rational than maximizing, say, net utility (for the sake of example only). I'll make a point of reservation here to say that I find RE too confused to be of any use.
Let's say that Baier is right about RE. Combined with the premise of ethical rationalism, that "if a moral requirement or recommendation is to be sound or acceptable, complying with it must be in accordance of reason", we should arrive at ethical egoism.
Several Problems with Egoism
EDIT: Seems we've already gotten into this, in a thread that begins roughly here and ends, at the moment, there. Comments welcome.
April 6 2006, 19:39:07 UTC 6 years ago
For a more detailed analysis of why this is and what this entails, see my paper, which I will link to on my journal on around the 14th. It will be a rough draft at that point, so comments will be welcome. And unlike certain other people who shall remain unmentioned, I actually will have the paper up then.
April 7 2006, 09:51:08 UTC 6 years ago
April 7 2006, 17:24:46 UTC 6 years ago
April 12 2006, 20:51:27 UTC 6 years ago
Whenever I see prescriptive theories in danger of becoming descriptive (and thus losing their purported normative power), this classic bit from Bentham's first chapter of Principles of Morals and Legislation always comes to mind:
"Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do....They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will but serve to demonstrate and confirm it."
Of course, Bentham goes on to tell us that what we ought to do is seek to increase pleasure as per his formulation of the principle of utility. The question this begs is: if we are at the whims of pain and pleasure, and (presumably) all of our actions are aimed at increasing pleasure, how helpful is it to prescribe that we do what we are already doing? In fact, what Bentham asserts we cannot do otherwise! Seemingly, we have no choice.
Perhaps this is an uncharitable interpretation (and I certainly don't think anything I've said here is a deathblow to any theories of Utilitarianism), but one might desire a bit more rigor from Bentham.
On a last note, I'm a bit surprised you hadn't mentioned any of Rachels' objections to PE, RE, or EE. I always get a good chuckle from the bit on Lincoln saving pigs in The Elements of Moral Philosophy.
April 13 2006, 05:11:50 UTC 6 years ago
While Rachels is generally where it's at, I wasn't satisfied with his "rejection" of EE. If memory serves, he finds himself unable to dismiss it conclusively, and says something approximating "perhaps we cannot convince the ethical egoist, but that's the best philosophy can do." I think philosophy can do better: either it's the case that the interests of others count morally for me or they do not. Since assuming the latter inflames my intuitions at nearly every turn, I should consign it to the dustbin, not wring my hands about what I should consider proof.